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ABSTRACT 
 
Extending the literature on competition in the presence of road tolls, this paper explores the 
implications of competition between two cities.  We assume that the two city authorities wish 
to maximise the welfare of their own residents whilst taking advantage of tax export 
mechanisms available to them by charging traffic from the competing city.  The problem is 
first posed as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) which is a 
special form of a Nash game with a hierarchical structure. Due to the inherent non-convexity 
of EPECs, it is possible that only local solutions are found. Hence we introduce the concept 
of local Nash Equilibrium. Using a simple network and grid search to explore the response 
surfaces and to determine the Nash Equilibrium toll levels, we conduct two numerical 
examples with a simple test network but with different trip demand assumptions. Our 
numerical examples indicate the possibility that there may exist multiple local Nash solutions 
and that competition may lead to a sub-optimal outcome for one or both authorities 
depending on whether there exists a stronger player. We also consider the impact of elasticity 
of demand and other parameter assumptions on the potential number of Nash solutions. We 
then introduce the notion of collusion whereby cities share out some of the revenues 
collected and demonstrate that as collusion levels are increased then the Nash solutions tend 
to converge towards the global regulator solution when cities are assumed identical and both 
cities are incentivised to collude.  However with asymmetric demand then the weaker city’s 
residents remain worse off than in the no toll case and the stronger city has no incentive to 
collude.  
 
Key words: Networks, pricing, competition, Nash Equilibrium, Tolls 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a strong focus in recent years on road user charging, with economic theory 
suggesting benefits will accrue to a city from a combination of congestion relief and 
recycling of revenues within the city (Walters, 1961). Beyond the theoretical benchmark of 
full marginal cost pricing the design of practical charging schemes, such as those adopted by 
UK local authorities in recent Transport Innovation Funds (Department for Transport, 2005; 
Transport Select Committee, 2006) bids, have generally focused on pricing cordons around 
single, mono-centric cities (Shepherd et al, 2008). It is possible in such cases to design the 
location and level of charges for a cordon so as to systematically maximise the potential 
welfare gain to the city (Shepherd and Sumalee, 2004; Sumalee et al, 2005), yet there is an 
implicit premise here that the city acts in isolation.  
 
In this paper we consider the implications of competition between cities when each considers 
the introduction of fiscal demand management measures by setting road tolls. In the context 
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of toll roads, several authors have studied the welfare implications of competition between a 
public and private operator (e.g.  Verhoef et al, 1996; De Palma and Lindsey, 2000; Yang 
and Woo, 2004; Zhang and Levinson, 2005; Yang et al, 2009). The focus in these studies is 
on the impacts of alternative ownership regimes, and of public versus private control in the 
form of either monopoly pricing or competitive Nash equilibria. Xiao et al, (2007) extended 
these works by bounding the inefficiency of private toll road competition for a network with 
parallel links. 
 
In addition to the often discussed issue of competition among profit motivated organizations, 
there also exist competitive issues between public sector organisations. Proost and Sen 
(2006), used the TRENEN (Proost and Van Dender 2001) strategic model to investigate the 
outcome of a Nash Game between a local authority in control of parking charges and 
regional government in charge of a toll cordon.  They found that the city was incentivised to 
over-charge for parking. Tax exporting behaviour is a concept from the public economics 
literature (e.g. Stiglitz, 2000). In the context of using tolls as fiscal instruments, the argument 
is that local governments wish to score political points with their residents and do so by 
laying the burden of paying the toll onto “foreign” (i.e. non-resident) users in the local area. 
This tax exporting behaviour is a theme which has continued to recur in the literature e.g. De 
Borger et al (2007), Ubbels and Verhoef (2008), Guhenmann et al (2011).   
 
One limitation of the study by Proost and Sen (2006), which the authors recognized, was that 
the TRENEN strategic model does not embody a network and is thus unable to take the route 
choice considerations of users expliclity into account. The modelling framework in 
Gühnemann et al (2011) was a tolling game between two authorities, one controlling a 
cordon surrounding the city of Sheffield in the UK which was plagued by air quality 
problems and another surrounding the Peak district which had the problem of serious through 
traffic. One key conclusion of this study was that the Peak district tended to act as a net tax 
exporter because traffic had no alternative but to travel through the Peak district as 
alternative routes were even more costly in terms of travel time and distances. In addition, it 
was found that the Nash game tended to result in the transfer of environmental problems 
from one jurisdiction to affect other areas and this lent support to the argument that some 
form of global regulation was necessary since left to their own devices, authorities might be 
tempted to play “beggar thy neighbour” policies which would have a detrimental impact on 
global welfare. De Borger et al (2007) and Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) examined the issues 
of competition between countries/regions setting tolls and capacities, investigating the 
implications of players adopting two-stage games but using networks where route choice was 
also absent. In this paper we explicitly take into account route choice. 
 
We build on our previous work on representing multi-actor systems through game-theoretic 
representations where the problem of toll competition between operators in a network was 
considered. Represented through a Nash network game, in Koh and Shepherd (2010) 
conditions were established under which the equilibria of such non-cooperative decision-
making differed markedly from the solution that could arise from a more collusive game 
between operators. It was also shown that this latter, collusive solution could be determined 
based on the ‘particle swarm optimisation’ method (Koh, 2008). This work also 
demonstrated the potential for multiple Nash Equilibria to occur in games where players face 
an equilibrium constraint which parallels the results discussed in the context of bidding 
strategies of generators in deregulated transmission constrained electricity markets (Hu and 
Ralph, 2007;Son and Baldick, 2004). 
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The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 sets up the problem 
of competition between two cities and provides the mathematical background. Using a small 
network, two scenarios for a single test network are studied in Section 3 utilising simple grid 
search (an exhaustive search over the parameter space) to identify potential Nash Equilibria.  
These two scenarios differ only with respect to the individual components of the trip matrix, 
the first representing identical cities and then the second where one city is more attractive 
than the other as a destination thus introducing the notion of strong and weak player. We also 
investigate the impacts of changes in the elasticity of demand on the existence of multiple 
Nash Equilibria in the network. Section 4 considers the situation when cities are able to share 
a proportion of the revenues collected from road pricing even though they continue to be in 
competition with each other. Section 5 wraps up the paper with some conclusions and 
directions for further research. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A highway network is represented as a graph comprising links indexed by the set 
 1,2,...,| |L L . We assume that there are two regulatory authorities (labelled A and B), 
each authority having their own pre-defined subset of network links over which they may 
charge a toll: authority i being able to set a toll on links in set iL L  (for {A,B}i ), 
with A BL L o    . Although not necessary, for simplicity we make the restriction in this 
paper that each authority i has a single
1
 toll level 0i  that they may determine and levy on 
all links in their link sub-set iL .  Together, then, the two tolls to be determined can be 
collected in the vector  
#
A B τ  
 with # denoting the transpose. In practice, in addition to 
non-negativity constraints, we may wish to impose additional simple bounds on the tolls (e.g. 
upper bounds that are believed reasonable), and thus for each }B,A{i , we suppose that 
there is a pre-defined set  2 & 0iT x x    that defines the permissible tolls, so that we 
must have A BT T τ . The travellers in the network are all supposed to perceive these tolls in 
the same way, regardless of which authority levied the toll and regardless of their own socio-
economic status. Aside from the tolls, travellers perceive other attributes that motivate their 
travel (e.g. travel time), and for each link these are collected together in a single generalized 
cost of travel, excluding tolls. This toll-excluding generalized cost typically will depend, 
through congestion, on the flow on the link, and so for each link 1,2,...,| |l L  we represent 
it as a monotonically increasing, continuous function ( )l lc v  of the flow lv  on link l. Taking 
the tolls together with the toll-excluding generalized cost gives us the complete generalized 
cost function, given any link flow or toll levels as: 
 
 
A A
B B
( ) if 
( , ) ( ) if ( 1,2,...,| |, 0, )
( ) otherwise
l l
l l l l l A B
l l
c v l L
g v c v l L l L v T T
c v


 

      


τ τ  (1) 
                                                 
1 The assumption of a single toll level is not restrictive. Firstly, cordon schemes currently in operation such as in 
Bergen (Norway), Milan (Italy) and Stockholm (Sweden) have a uniform charge levels over a given modelled 
period, at all points entering the cordon area. Secondly, we do not wish to allow the city to charge a different 
amount to non-residents as this would be seen as less acceptable. 
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Clearly, should we wish to represent it that way, ( ) ( ,0)l lc g   for all l L . The functions 
(1) may be collected together into a vector mapping ( , )g v τ  with l
th
 element 
( , ) ( 1,2,...,| |)l lg v l Lτ
. 
 
Our network also comprises Origin-Destination (OD) movements indexed by the set 
{1,2,...,| |}K K , with ( )kd k K  denoting the travel demand for OD movement k. We 
suppose that in advance, we neither know the OD travel demand vector d nor the link flow 
vector v, but that they are contained in the demand-feasible set D given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( , ) : where , 0, 0k k k kk k
k K
D d d k K

 
       
 
v d v x Ax E x  (2) 
where ( )kx is the vector of link flows for OD movement k, where A is the node-link incidence 
matrix for the network, and where kE  is a vector that defines the origin and destination nodes 
for OD movement k (for more details the reader is referred to Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 
2004). 
 
We further suppose that for each origin-destination movement k, there exists a separable, 
bounded, continuous, monotonically increasing demand function that expresses the origin-
destination demand level for that movement as a function of the generalized OD travel cost 
for that movement. In fact, we shall refer not to the function itself but to its inverse (which 
exists under the stated assumptions), namely the OD generalized cost ( )k kw d  that would 
need to exist in order to generate a given level of OD travel demand kd , for each k K . 
These functions are assumed to be continuous, bounded, and monotonically decreasing.  
 
Given any particular toll vector τ , it is supposed that the resulting perceptions of generalized 
cost determine the OD travel demand and routing patterns through an elastic demand 
Wardrop equilibrium. Now, if the toll vector τ was to be decided by a single regulatory 
authority, then we could define a Global Regulatory Problem in the form of a Mathematical 
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), which (following Lawphongpanich and 
Hearn, 2004) is given by: 
 A B ,( , )
0
# #
Maximise  ( ) ( )
s.t. ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , )
kd
k l l l
T T D
k K l L
w z dz v c v
D
  
 

     
 τ v d
g v τ u v w d d e u e
 (3) 
Note that the toll vector itself does not appear in the upper level (social welfare) objective 
function of (3), its role instead is in shaping behaviour as represented in the lower level 
constraint. In fact, since under the stated assumptions on the cost and demand functions, 
there is a unique solution in (v,d) for any given toll vector, then the variational inequality 
constraint determines a unique such demand/flow allocation given any toll vector. Then we 
may simplify (3) so that only the toll vector appears as the maximization variable (since for 
any given toll vector, a unique demand and flow vector is uniquely generated by the VI 
constraint): 
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 A B
0
# #
Maximise  ( ) ( )
s.t. ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , )
kd
k l l l
T T
k K l L
w z dz v c v
D
 
 

     
 τ
g v τ u v w d d e u e
 (4) 
Problem (4) represents a situation in which a single regulator sets all the toll levels so as to 
maximize the benefit to the whole network. However, we shall also be specifically interested 
in the toll levels that arise if the two authorities compete. In this case, we assume that each 
authority has jurisdiction over setting tolls on its own set of links, but that its responsibility is 
only to trips that originate in its area. Thus, we partition the origin-destination movements 
into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets, such that iK  
is the index set of OD 
movements originating in authority i (for {A,B}i ), with A BK K K   and A BK K o   . 
In parallel, we also partition the link flow variable, such that liv  denotes the flow on link l of 
demand originating from Authority i, clearly with A B ( 1,2,...,| |)l l lv v v l L   .  In vector 
notation, if the authority link flows are collected in a | | 2L   matrix V , then they are related 
to the aggregate link flow vector by v V1 , where  1 1
T
1  . 
 
Let us first consider Authority A. Authority A is assumed to maximise social welfare of its 
own residents by adjusting the toll level of links over which it has control, anticipating the 
impact of the toll on travellers’ route and demand decisions, but reacting to the toll level 
levied by Authority B. That is to say, Authority A does not anticipate the effect that their 
own choice of toll will have on Authority B’s response, but they simply react to the toll set 
by Authority B. Let us assume for the moment that Authority B has already decided its toll 
level B B BT   , and that this is known to Authority A. Authority A is then supposed to 
determine its own toll level A  by solving an MPEC that is a variant of (3): 
 
 
A
A B A
A A
A A B B A A B
        ( , , )
0        such that
,( , )
#
1 #
2
Maximise  ( ) ( )
s.t.         , ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , )
kd
k l l l l l l
k K l L l L l L
T D
w z dz v c v v v v
D


   


   
 
   
  
       
  
   V d
V1 d
g V1 u V1 w d d e u e
 (5) 
The first term in the objective function of (5)  is the Marshallian measure of the trips made 
from origins located within Authority A’s jurisdiction. The second term represents the 
generalized cost of travel (excluding tolls) for traffic with origins in Authority A. The third 
term represents the toll revenue spent by residents from Authority A on links controlled by 
Authority B, i.e. those with origins in Authority A and travelling on tolled links in Authority 
B. This is a transfer payment and it increases the coffers of Authority B at the expense of 
Authority A. The fourth term represents the toll revenue spent by residents from Authority B 
within Authority A, this being a transfer payment that increases the coffers of Authority A at 
the expense of Authority B. The parameter  is a scalar tax exporting parameter, for which 
we shall assume a common value for both authorities (0 1)  . Our main numerical 
examples in Section 3 focus on taking the value of 1 and we consider varying alpha values 
in Section 4.   
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While problem (5) has a similar mathematical structure to problem (3) a key difference is 
that our problem is now defined in terms of link flows disaggregated by authority (the 
‘authority link flows’). In general networks, for any given toll vector, we cannot guarantee 
uniqueness of the authority link flows, even though our assumptions guarantee uniqueness of 
the total link flows. Therefore, if applied in a general network, (5) maximizes social welfare 
in two ways: partly through the toll, but additionally by assuming that we can control the 
authority link flows over-and-above the toll effect. Another way to view this is that while we 
assume user equilibrium for the total link flows, we assume system optimization for the 
authority link flow splits, wherever there is ambiguity in these splits to exploit (the so-called 
‘weak’ formulation of MPEC; see Červinka, 2008). However, at present our proposal is to 
restrict attention to applying (5) in special network structures in which the uniqueness of the 
total link flows automatically guarantees uniqueness of the authority link flows. 
 
We later consider such a network example. Assuming then, that our network structure 
ensures uniqueness of the authority link flows, problem (5) may be simplified to: 
 
 
A A
A
A
  
B
#
A #
B
Maximise  , ,
s.t.         , ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , )
T
S
D






  
  
  
  
       
  
V d
g V1 u V1 w d d e u e
 (6) 
 
Where 
 
A B A
A A A B B A A B
0
( , , ) ( ) ( )
kd
k l l l l l l
k K l L l L l L
S w z dz v c v v v v   
   
       τ V d  (7) 
As in our earlier problem (4), in problem (6) the flow variables ( , )V d  are uniquely 
determined by the variational inequality constraint at any given toll vector τ , under the 
restrictive assumptions we have made. In order to reflect this, introduce the following 
implicit functions: 
 
For given A B T T τ ,   
* *( ( ), ( ))V τ d τ denotes the unique solution in ( , )V d to 
  
#
#, ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , ) ( , )   .D D      g V1 τ u V1 w d d e u e V1 d  (8) 
Thus  (6) may then be equivalently written in succinct form: 
 
A A
A A A* *
A
  
B B B
Maximise  , ,
T
S

  
  
      
      
      
V d  (9) 
Now, in an analogous way to the behaviour of Authority A, Authority B determines its toll 
level B conditional on the toll level of Authority A by considering its own counterpart to 
objective function  (7)  namely: 
 
B A B
B B A B A B B A
0
( , , ) ( ) ( )
kd
k l l l l l l
k K l L l L l L
S w z dz v c v v v v   
   
       τ V d  (10) 
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The inter-play of the two authorities in each aiming to maximize its own welfare by setting a 
toll, conditional on the other authority’s toll, while anticipating the impact on the travellers, 
leads us to an example of a so-called Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints 
(EPEC) (Mordukhovich, 2005). This overall problem we may write, based on the functions 
defined in (7),(8) and (10), as follows: 
 
 Find  A B A B
T
T T     such that simultaneously: 
 
A A A A A A* * * *
A A A A
B B B B B B
A A A A A A* * * *
B B B B
B B B B B B
, , , ,
, , , ,
h h h
S S h T
S S h T
h h h
  
     
     
  
              
                
              
              
                
              
V d V d
V d V d
 (11) 
Problem  (11) assumes that the authorities can only determine their own toll conditional on 
the other authority, but places no further restriction on the admissible tolls. That is to say, the 
conditions require that, as far as one authority is concerned, their toll gives (marginally, i.e. 
based only optimizing their own toll) a global optimum solution to their individual MPEC, 
conditional on the other authority’s toll setting.  
 
Taking the conditions for both authorities together, equation  (11)  defines a problem that we 
will henceforth simply refer to as a Nash Equilibrium (NE) (Nash,1950). However, we shall 
also be interested in Nash games that are variants of (11), Specifically if, rather than each 
authority determining a global optimum toll conditional on the other authority's toll choice, 
we consider the possibility that each authority only determines a local optimum to their 
individual MPEC. In this case we require conditions (11) only to hold within a local 
neighbourhood of the given toll vector. Following Son and Baldick (2004), we shall refer to 
an equilibrium of such a Nash game as a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE). Thus for an LNE, 
each authority only needs establish optimality within a neighbourhood of the given solution 
(see Ye and Zhu, 2003, for such an example). 
 
Since the LNE conditions are weaker, the solution set to the NE problem is contained within 
the solution set to the LNE. It is our proposal that both kinds of solution are relevant for 
investigation, since it is not clear which is a more realistic representation of the behaviour of 
authorities in setting their tolls. This is an issue we return to in the case studies.  
 
 
3. CASE STUDIES 
 
 
All our case studies use the same topological network as shown in Figure 1. The travel cost 
on all links in the network adopt the standard BPR functional form as given in (12).  The free 
flow travel time parameter (
0
t ) is 450 seconds for all links except 2,5,8 and 11 which is 1000 
seconds. The capacity parameter (
l
 ) is 1500 pcus/hr for all links except for 2,5,8 and 11 
which is 3000 pcus/hr. The links (2,5,8 and 11) therefore represent a high capacity bypass 
that avoids travel through the town centre. 
 4
0
( ) (1 0.15( ))l
l l
l
v
c v t

   (12) 
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<<INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
 
 
Figure 1:Network for Numerical Examples
2
 
 
On the demand side there are 12 Origin-Destination pairs. All nodes excluding Node 3 are 
origin or destination zones. There are two Central Business Districts (CBD) (zone 2 and zone 
4) located within Authority A and B respectively. 
 
The dotted line through Node 3 on Figure 1 demarcates the boundary of jurisdiction between 
the two authorities. The base demand represents a typical morning peak with dominant flows 
to the CBDs from the suburb of each local authority (zones 1 and 5).  However we also 
introduce demand to/from other zones which represent interaction between the authorities 
with associated problems of through traffic. We assume elastic demand and the demand 
function, which gives the trips as a function of the generalised costs of travel,   adopts the 
power law specification: 
 
,0
,0
( ) ,pk
k k
k
b
d d k K
b
   (13) 
In (13), 
,0k
d ,
,0k
b ,
k
b refer to the base trips, base costs and costs for origin destination pair 
k and p is the power parameter with the restriction that 0p  . We assume that p  does not 
vary by OD pair. Equation (13) implies an inverse demand function of the form (14) 
 
1
,0
,0
( ) ( ) ,pkk k k
k
d
w d b k K
d
   (14) 
We assume that Authority A sets a uniform common toll on Links 1 and 6 to simulate a 
cordon into its CBD zone 2 while Authority B sets a uniform common toll on Links 7 and 12 
to simulate a cordon for travel into its CBD zone 4.  In this way we represent a situation 
which may arise in reality, namely that of cities who both wish to set up a cordon charge 
around their CBD with the idea of maximizing the welfare of their residents (as set out in 
(7)). 
 
                                                 
2
 The numbers indicated are link numbers referred to in the text and direction of travel is indicated by the 
arrows. The dotted line down node 3 demarcates the limits of jurisdiction of each authority. 
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As noted in section 2, a key property required of our formulation (in moving from (5) to (6)) 
is uniqueness of link flows disaggregated by authority, at any given toll vector. This is 
established for the particular network under consideration in Appendix A, requiring some 
mild additional assumptions that are readily verifiable during our numerical analysis, and 
indeed they have been verified to hold. Considering Authority A’s network (by symmetry, 
analogous implications can be drawn for Authority B’s network), uniqueness is established 
by a combination of (a) identifying routes that would never be efficient under Wardrop 
conditions; (b) applying conservation-of-flow at the authority level; and (c) noting where 
authority flows do and do not mix. In the case of Authority A’s network (analogous 
properties hold for Authority B’s network, by symmetry), we end up with mixing of the 
flows between authorities on links 1, 3 and 6 only, whereas links 2 and 4 only carry 
Authority A flow and link 5 only carries Authority B flow.  
 
In our numerical experiments, we consider two different cases.  In both cases the network 
remains as defined above and there is symmetry between the network within Authority A and 
that within Authority B.  The only difference between the two cases concerns the individual 
trips within the trip matrix. In case study 1 (hereinafter ‘case 1’) the base demand in the no 
toll case is also symmetric which represents a case where cities are equal in terms of 
production and attraction and in terms of network supply.  For case study 2 (hereinafter ‘case 
2’) the same network is used but we adjusted the base demand so that the city in Authority A 
is seen as stronger in terms of its ability to attract users.  Details of the matrix used in each 
case study are given in the relevant sections.  
 
To solve the global regulator problem for each case study, we applied the Cutting Constraint 
algorithm of Hearn and Lawphongpanich (2004). We set out details of the CCA in Appendix 
B.  In other cases, we carried out a grid search of the welfare obtained by each authority with 
tolls between 0 and 1000 in units of 10. In some cases we refined the grid search between 
units of 1 to “zoom in” on the potential solutions. For ease of exposition, we use the notation 
{ , }A B   to indicate a particular combined toll strategy tuple denoting the tolls set by 
Authority A and B respectively.  
 
3.1 Case 1: Symmetric Demand 
 
Table 1 shows the details of the matrix that is used for Case 1.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
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Table 1: Base Trips (
,0k
d ) and (Base Costs, 
,0k
b ) for Case 1. 
 
Authority in 
Charge 
 
From    To 
       
 
1 
(Residential 
Zone in 
Authority A) 
2 
(CBD of 
Authority A) 
4 
(Residential 
Zone in 
Authority B) 
5 
(CBD of 
Authority B) 
A 1 0 1000 
(488.08) 
200 
(1389.75) 
100 
(1839.86) 
A 2 100 
(450.11) 
0 100 
(901.67) 
100 
(1351.77) 
B 4 100 
(1351.77) 
100 
(901.67) 
0 100 
(450.11) 
B 5 100 
(1839.86) 
200 
(1389.75) 
1000 
(488.08) 
0 
 
 
3.1.1 Case 1: Global Regulator Benchmark 
 
As a benchmark, let us assume that a global regulator is in place to determine the uniform toll 
on both Links 1 and 6 and another uniform toll on Links 7 and 12. As mentioned, this 
problem is a standard Continuous Toll Pricing Problem and can be solved with the Cutting 
Constraint Algorithm. In this case the objective function for the “Global Regulator” is given 
by (4).  
 
The welfare surface of the Global Regulator’s problem for Case 1 is shown in Figure 2 with a 
contour plot on the right.  Notice that for the global regulator we found in this problem that 
there exists only one optimum around a toll combination of (80,80).  Beyond toll levels of 
around 90 seconds from either authority then there is a sudden drop off in benefits which 
continues to be the case as toll levels are increased to 1000 seconds (not shown). 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
 
Figure 2: (Left Pane) Surface Plot of Global Welfare for Case 1 around region of the optimum; 
(Right Pane) Contour Plot of Global Welfare for Case 1 around region of the optimum. 
 
Table 2 shows the solution and as expected due to symmetry both authorities’ welfare 
increases by the same amount and tolls are set to the same value in both authorities. 
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<<INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
Table 2: Results of the Global Regulator Problem for Case 1 
 (all units in seconds)  
Scenario Global 
Regulator 
Authority A 
Toll on: Link 1 and Link 6 
80 
Authority B 
Toll on: Link 7 and Link 12 
80 
Welfare Gain (vs Do Nothing) 20,292 
Welfare of Authority A 10,146 
Welfare of Authority B 10,146 
 
 
3.1.2 Case 1: Nash Game  
 
First to explore the potential solutions we evaluated the welfare for each authority for a given 
toll pair with tolls ranging between 0-1000 seconds.  Given that we have only two uniform 
tolls in our example then it is possible to visualize the welfare surfaces and to numerically 
estimate the gradients with respect to the authority’s own toll at each point.  Using a finite 
difference approach (Morton and Mayers, 2005) we were able to estimate these gradients and 
produce contour plots showing where the gradients are equal to zero.  This is equivalent to 
finding where the “response surfaces” of the Nash game intersect, such intersections show 
where condition (11) could potentially be satisfied.  Figure 3 shows the contour plots and 
points of intersection of the zero contours. In the figure the vertical lines show where the 
gradient of welfare for Authority B is zero and the horizontal lines show where the gradient 
of welfare for Authority A is zero as tolls set by B and A are varied respectively. 
 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Contour Plot for Case 1 (α=1) 
 
Each intersection point is therefore a potential LNE. However we can immediately disregard 
several solutions because for an LNE, the additional requirement is that they must intersect 
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where both authorities’ objectives are simultaneously maximized. We can identify 4 such 
solutions (marked on Figure 3) where both welfare surfaces are passing through a maximum 
by inspection of the welfare surfaces and by recognizing that there is a particular pattern to 
the welfare surfaces as tolls are increased which is maintained across the full range of tolls 
investigated. Figure 4 shows how welfare for Authority A varies with its own toll, for given 
values of tolls set by Authority B (85 or 505).  Notice that there is a local maximum around a 
toll of 85 seconds followed by a minimum at a toll of 105 followed by a maximum around a 
toll of 505. It is worth noting here that the optimal toll for player A of 505 seconds does not 
appear to be affected by the toll played by player B.  This suggests that there is little or no 
interaction between the players in the high toll regime.  We come back to explore this and the 
number of potential LNE solutions later. This pattern is repeated for the other player due to 
symmetry, and we can then infer that the intersections between the first and third contours for 
each player in Figure 3 are where the simultaneous maxima resulting in an LNE may exist.   
  
 
 
Figure 4: (Left Pane) Welfare Plot for Authority A Showing Optimum at around 505 when 
Authority B levies a toll of 85; (Right Pane) Welfare Plot for Authority A Showing Optimum at 
around 505 when Authority B levies a toll of 505. 
 
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
Using the welfare surfaces provided by the grid search we were able to confirm that four 
LNE  exists as shown in Table 3 which all satisfied the condition in (11). 
  
<<INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
Table 3: Local Nash Equilibria for Case 1 (all units are seconds and α = 1) 
 
Solution  
Number  
Toll Set by 
Authority A 
Toll Set by 
Authority B 
Welfare of 
Authority A 
Welfare of 
Authority B 
Total 
Welfare 
1 85 85 9,096 (2) 9,096 (2) 18,192 
2 505 85 24,076 (1) -101,839 (4) -77,763 
3 505 505 -86,872 (3) -86,872 (3) -173,744 
4 85 505 -101,839 (4) 24,076 (1) -77,763 
Figures in parentheses show the preference ranking for each authority pertaining to a particular outcome 
 
To explore the solutions further we calculated the vector field plot of the reaction functions at 
each point on the grid. The arrows in the vector force field plots in Figure 5 show the finite 
differenced approximations to the gradients of the welfare surfaces for each player with 
respect to their own toll and the direction a player should move when selecting their toll 
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levels given the current tolls. The left hand pane of the figure shows the vector force field 
centred on the Nash Equilibrium labelled solution 1, while the right hand pane shows the 
vector force field centred on the Nash Equilibrium labelled solution 3. From inspection of the 
Vector Field Plots we can confirm that these are LNE. It is evident from the vector plots that 
the basin of attraction is far smaller around the first of these solutions and as a toll set by the 
other player moves beyond 100 seconds the players may well be attracted to solution 3.  
 
 
Figure 5: (Left Pane) Vector Field Plot of Reaction Functions around Toll Vector of 85,85 for 
Case 1 (α=1); (Right Pane) Vector Force Plot of Reaction Functions around Toll Vector of 
505,505 for Case  1  (α=1) 
 
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
Similar plots show that the basin of attraction around solutions 2 and 4 are also relatively 
small and that solution 3 is the only solution which satisfies (11) in the global sense.  
Solutions 1, 2 and 4 are therefore only Nash solutions in a local neighbourhood i.e. LNE.  
 
An alternative way to look at the outcome of the authorities’ decision making and whether or 
not they act in a local neighbourhood or not when setting tolls is to use a simplified pay-off 
table as was done in Son and Baldick (2004).  
 
Table 4 shows the pay-off matrix in terms of welfare changes for authorities A and B given 
the tolls can only be set at values of 0, 85 or 505 (taken from our knowledge of where the 
possible LNE occur). 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
 
Table 4:  Case 1: Pay-off matrix (thousand seconds) near each LNE solution (Welfare A, 
Welfare B)       
Toll A/B 0 85 505 
0 (0,0) (-40.4, 50.7) (-150, 66.8) 
85 (50.7, -40.4) (9.1, 9.1) ( -103.0, 24.1) 
505 (66.8, -150) (24.1, -103.0) (-88,-88) 
 
 
The arrows in the table show the direction in which each authority would move in terms of 
toll set given the current tolls. Firstly we notice that both players have an incentive to move 
away from the no toll situation assuming that the other player does not charge.  That is both 
have a first mover incentive.  Then if we consider player A to move first, then player A has 
an incentive to move through to toll=85 and then to a toll of 505.  Player B would then 
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respond accordingly and with these limited decisions available to the players the outcome is 
always the NE solution which satisfies condition (11) i.e. it confirms the fact that solution 3 
is in fact the NE rather than simply an LNE. 
 
Next we widen the grid to include some more local decisions around the solution at {85,85} 
as shown in Table 5. Now we see that when the authority considers local moves only around 
tolls of 85 seconds then it is possible to remain in solutions 1,2 and 4 i.e. the {85,85} solution 
or one of the other {85,505} solutions.  This can be seen for example by examining the local 
decision around the {85,85} pay-off cell.  From this cell there is no benefit for either player 
to increase or decrease the toll and so this is an LNE.   However we can also notice that as 
soon as one authority charges above 90 seconds then they are incentivised to move towards 
solution 3 the NE solution.  The question of how authorities will set tolls in reality is 
obviously linked to the scale of the tolls and whether these are considered to be acceptable to 
the public.  Whilst we have not defined how strategies are set in this paper (as we have 
simply explored the response surfaces to find solutions to the problem), our future research 
will investigate the dynamics of the toll setting strategies and how this may result in an LNE 
solution. 
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
Table 5:  Case 1: Pay-off matrix (thousand seconds) with local toll moves around (85, 85)  
Toll A/B 0 80 85 90 505 
0 (0,0) (-38.0, 49.4) (-40.4, 50.7) (-42.7, 49.5) (-150, 66.8) 
80 (49.4, -38.0) (10.1, 10.1) (7.7, 11.5)  (5.4, 10.2)  (-104.4, 26.5)  
85 (50.7, -40.4) (11.5, 7.7) (9.1, 9.1) (6.7, 7.8) ( -103.0, 24.1) 
90 (49.5, -42.7) (10.2, 5.4) (7.8, 6.7) 
 
(5.4, 5.4)  (-104.4 , 21.7) 
505 (66.8, -150) (26.5, -104.4) (24.1, -103.0) (21.7, -104.4) (-88,-88) 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Case 1: Policy implications  
 
Firstly we note from the welfare surfaces (not shown) that both players would have an 
incentive to begin charging given that the other player does not charge.  Once both players 
begin to toll then, as shown in Table 3, Authority A would clearly prefer Solution 2 while 
Authority B would prefer the diametrically opposed solution in terms of tolls, solution 4.   If 
we assume that the authorities then have full information about the expected change in 
welfare over the full range of tolls then for a given toll played by their opponent, they would 
move towards a toll of around 505 seconds.  In response the second mover would also set a 
toll of around 505 seconds (as can be inferred by Figure 4 above) and the authorities would 
end up at solution 3 which is a classic Prisoner’s dilemma whereby both authorities are worse 
off than in the no toll case. 
 
It is also interesting from a policy point of view that solution 1 with tolls set at {85,85} is in 
the vicinity of the global regulator solution with both authorities receiving an increase in 
welfare.  It could be argued that such a solution may be found if the upper bounds of the toll 
sets considered were somehow restricted to within the range 0-90 seconds.  As this is only a 
toy network example we cannot say anything about the scale issue here but we can recognise 
that in reality there may well exist an upper bound on the toll set by some public 
acceptability limits.  Otherwise as solutions 1, 2 and 4 are only NE in a local neighbourhood 
then these are unlikely to be obtained in a game with full information.  Later we discuss the 
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case where the authorities are assumed to collude by reducing the value of α, but next we 
examine the potential for multiple LNE. 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Case 1: Exploring the potential for multiple LNE 
 
As noted earlier when discussing Figures 3 and 4 the optimal toll for authority A does not 
appear to be affected by the toll set by authority B in the high toll regime.  This section first 
of all explains how this comes about by focussing on flow regimes and then explores which 
other factors can influence whether or not multiple LNE may exist. 
 
 
Figure 6: Flow regimes under alternative toll assumptions 
 
Figure 6 shows where the flows on the network can be decomposed into 4 “regimes” 
depending on the toll tuple and that these flow regimes correspond to the contours from 
figure 3. We can draw the following insights regarding traffic flows in these 4 regimes.  
  
1. When there are no tolls, the bypass links are not used at all. Hence all traffic 
regardless of destination utilise links through the town centre. This is due to the 
difference in free-flow costs for using the bypass compared with the town centre 
route. Within regime 1, as the tolls are increased then eventually some users begin to 
use the bypass links 2 and 11 and we hence obtain a “mixed traffic regime” i.e. flows 
on both the town centre route and flows on the bypass. Regime 1 is characterized by 
the set of tolls below 100 seconds.  
2. In flow regime 2, once the tolls set by Authority B (on links 7 and 12) increase 
beyond 100 seconds, all through traffic in authority B’s area uses the bypass links.  
That is a toll greater than 100 seconds invokes the use of links 8 and 11 (the bypass 
routes in Authority B) but not links 2 or 5 which is still a function of tolls set by 
Authority A.  The only traffic using the tolled links 7+12 are effectively captive (as in 
equilibrium they have no competitive alternative route across the range of feasible toll 
levels) to those links and we have a separated regime in B’s part of the network. By 
this we mean that sub-networks such as link 8 versus links 7+10 do not have the same 
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cost at equilibrium and this is obtained by segregation of OD demands. Note that by 
symmetry, flow regime 3 is similar to flow regime 2 but responds to tolls on links 1 
and 6. 
3. In Regime 4 all bypass links are used and the traffic using the tolled routes is only 
“effectively captive traffic” (traffic that have destinations within the tolled area i.e. 
zone 2 or zone 4 which do not have any competitive alternative route across the range 
of feasible toll levels). All other traffic uses the bypass links.  Each sub-network is in 
equilibrium but with higher costs for through traffic.  
These regimes all come about because of the extremely low delays experienced on the bypass 
links relative to those on the through links.  With our base demands it seems that the delays 
which result on the bypass links are negligible compared to the free flow cost of 1000 
seconds and that the assignment becomes an all-or-nothing assignment in regimes 2-4.  
 
Understanding these regimes helps us explain why the optimal toll set by A does not appear 
to be affected by the toll set by B in the high toll regime.  Solution 4 lies in the separated 
flow regime so that the toll is in effect only affecting captive users and no more re-routing in 
response to a toll is possible.  This separated regime implies that the optimal toll for player A 
is dependent only on the demand towards the central zone (node 2) and that the welfare 
function can only be increased by affecting the consumer surplus of own residents heading 
towards node 2 and the congestion experienced on link 1 plus the amount of revenue 
collected on link 6 from those non-residents travelling to node 2.  All other flows and link 
costs are fixed once the tolls exceed 100 seconds.  This sub-problem faced by player A is not 
influenced by the toll set by player B as all those who enter A’s network from authority B 
have not been charged a toll in B’s network by definition.  They have either come from zone 
4 via link 9 without charge or have come from zone 5 via the bypass link 11 again with no 
charge.  This explains why there is no interaction effect between players once we are in this 
separated regime.  Next we investigate whether the number of LNE solutions varies with 
increased elasticity. 
 
3.1.5 Case 1: Number of Potential LNE with changes in Elasticity of Demand 
 
The power law demand function implies a constant elasticity demand assumption and this is 
reflected in the parameter p in (13). Specifically p represents the (absolute) percentage 
change in demand as a result of a percentage increase in generalized costs (inclusive of tolls).  
Thus with everything else (base demands and network link parameters) held constant, we can 
vary the parameter p to assess the impact of an (absolute) increase in elasticity on the 
number of potential LNE in the network. 
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Figure 1a (Left Pane) Contours of Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -0.75  (Right Pane) Contours of 
Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -1 
 
 
 
Figure 7b: (Left Pane) Contours of Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -1.25  (Right Pane) Contours 
of Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -1.5 
 
 
Figure 7c: (Left Pane) Contours of Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -1.75  (Right Pane) Contours 
of Case 1 (α=1) with Elasticity = -2 
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<<INSERT TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE >> 
Table 6:  Case 1:Number of possible LNE as Elasticity Increases 
 
p (Elasticity 
Parameter) 
Number of 
Intersections 
Number of LNE Toll Level at Nash Equilibrium 
(seconds) 
0.58 
(Base Case) 
9 4 {505,505} 
0.75 9 4 {320,320} 
1 9 4 {85,85} 
1.25 9 4 {85,85} 
1.5 9 4 {85,85} 
1.75 4 4 {85,85} 
2.0 1 1 {85,85} 
 
 
Figures 7a to 7c show the contour plots and hence number of intersections as elasticity is 
increased from 0.58 to 2.0. As mentioned earlier, some intersections of the contours are 
eliminated from potential consideration as LNE because although the numerically estimated 
gradients are equal to 0, at least one of the Authority’s objective functions attains a minimum 
at that point. This contradicts the requirements that for an LNE both objectives must be 
simultaneously maximized. Hence by process of inspection, we can eliminate some 
intersections from consideration. However as shown in Figures 7a-7c and in Table 6, it is still 
clear that with elasticities up to -1.75, there are 4 LNE. Somewhere between a value of -1.75 
and -2.0 the number of LNE is reduced to one, as with an elasticity of -2, multiple NE are 
eliminated from this network. The one remaining solution is in the mixed flow regime.  This 
demonstrates that there can exist networks which exhibit only one NE solution and that in 
this case there would not be a prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
Table 6 also shows that as elasticity increases, the NE solution tends towards the low toll 
regime rather than the high toll regime.  The left pane of Figure 8 shows the graph of welfare 
for Authority A as the toll it sets varies (Authority B’s toll held fixed) in the case when the 
parameter p is kept at the base value of 0.58. We note that the global optimum of welfare in 
this case occurs to the right of the local optimum and this is in the high toll regime. In 
contrast, the right pane of Figure 8 shows the same graph with absolute elasticity increased 
to 1.25p  . In this case, we note that the global optimum occurs to the left of the local 
optimum in the low toll regime. This demonstrates why, as elasticity is increased we see the 
NE solution move from a high toll regime to a low toll one.  This has important policy 
implications in that if elasticity is higher then the authorities are less likely to end up in a 
Prisoner’s dilemma, the users will face lower tolls and all residents will see an increase in 
total welfare.  
 
It is also noticeable that the low toll Nash solution does not change as elasticity increases.  
This is again down to the specific parameters in our network and in particular it is related to 
the very small impact on delay on the bypass links as a small proportion of the flow is 
diverted from link 1 to link 2 for example.  With low levels of through traffic, the congestion 
impact on the bypass links is only a fraction of a second so that the optimal toll is always in 
the same integer range.  This is network specific and is not expected to be generalised. 
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Figure 8. (Left Pane) Global optimum of own authority welfare  is in the high toll regime and to 
the right of the local optimum at elasticity of -0.58 as own authority toll varies ; (Right Pane) 
Global optimum of own authority welfare is in the low toll regime and to the left of the local 
optimum at elasticity of -1.25 as own authority toll varies. 
 
We did also investigate other changes to the network parameters and found that if we 
increase both the through demand and adapt the congestion function on the links – to 
increase the delays on the bypass links then this can also result in there being only one NE 
solution.  Whilst we have therefore demonstrated that multiple NE may exist under certain 
conditions and that under other conditions only one NE solution may exist, we are not in a 
position to say whether for any general network there will be one or multiple NE solutions.  
This is something that should be investigated in further research. 
 
3.2 Case 2: Asymmetric Demand 
 
In Case 2, we modified the Demand Matrix used in Case 1 from that shown in Table to that 
as shown in Table 7.  However the network remains exactly the same in both cases.  
 
Table 7: Base Trips (
,0k
d ) and (Base Costs, 
,0k
b ) for Case 2. 
Authority in 
Charge 
 
From    To 
       
 
1 
(Residential 
Zone in 
Authority A) 
2 
(CBD of 
Authority A) 
4 
(Residential 
Zone in 
Authority B) 
5 
(CBD of 
Authority B) 
A 1 0 1300 
(488.08) 
0 0 
A 2 100 
(450.34) 
0 100 
(900.04) 
100 
(1350.06) 
B 4 100 
(1361.26) 
100 
(910.92) 
0 100 
(450.02) 
B 5 200 
(1849.35) 
400 
(1399.00) 
700 
(488.08) 
0 
 
 
 
In constructing the asymmetric case we have maintained the number of trips originating from 
each zone, but have re-distributed them so that the CBD in Authority A is now more 
attractive relative to the CBD in authority B.  Note that the total number of trips from A to B 
is reduced from 500 to 200 while the number from B to A increases from 500 to 800. 
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3.2.1 Case 2: Global Regulator Benchmark 
 
The welfare surface of the Global Regulator’s problem for Case 2 is shown in Figure 9 with a 
contour plot on the right.  In addition, our search over the entire surface confirms that similar 
to Case 1,  there exists only one optimum around a toll set of {90,80}.  The results are 
summarised in Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: (Left Pane) Surface Plot of Global Welfare for Case 2 around region of the optimum; 
(Right Pane) Contour Plot of Global Welfare for Case 2 around region of the optimum. 
 
Table 1: Results of the Global Regulator Problem for Case 2 
 (all units in seconds)  
Scenario Global 
Regulator 
Authority A 
Toll on: Link 1 and Link 6 
90 
Authority B 
Toll on: Link 7 and Link 12 
80 
Welfare Gain (vs Do Nothing) 21418 
Welfare of Authority A 62012  
Welfare of Authority B -40593 
 
 
It is interesting that Authority B suffers from negative welfare even in the global regulator 
problem.  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Case 2: Nash Game 
 
For the case when α = 1, i.e., full tax exporting between the authorities, we again used a finite 
grid search and contours of the gradients to explore the response surfaces for each authority 
to identify where potential local NE that may exist. Figure 10 shows the contour plots and 
points of intersection of the zero contours.  
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Figure 10: Contour Plot for Case 2 (α=1) 
 
 
Once again we can identify 4 potential solutions where both welfare surfaces are passing 
through a maximum by inspection of the welfare surfaces and by recognizing that there is a 
particular pattern to the welfare surfaces as tolls are increased which is maintained across the 
full range of tolls investigated.  
 
Using the welfare surfaces provided by the grid search we were able to confirm that once 
again there are four LNE solutions as shown in Table  which all satisfied the condition in (11)
. 
 
Table 9: Local Nash Equilibria for Case 2 (all units are seconds and α = 1) 
Solution  
Number  
Toll Set by 
Authority A 
Toll Set by 
Authority B 
Welfare of 
Authority A 
Welfare of 
Authority B 
Total 
Welfare 
1 85 81 58025 (3) -36666 (1) 21359 
2 955 81 150671 (1) -392798 (3) -242127 
3 955 150 142737 (2) -422454 (4) -279717 
4 85 150 49777 (4) -65860 (2) -16083 
Figures in parentheses show the preference ranking for each authority pertaining to a particular outcome. 
 
It is the case that in all 4 LNE, the impact on B’s welfare is adverse, recall that B suffers 
from negative welfare even under the global regulator benchmark. Compared to case 1, it 
seems that the outcome will favour the stronger player. Solution 2 and Solution 3 are both 
highly favoured outcomes for Player A with the same toll level of 955 set by player A which 
demonstrates the power of Authority A. Comparing the preference ranking in Case 2 with 
that from Case 1 and with reference to Table 9, now Authority A gives Solution 1 {85,81} 
nearer to the global regulator outcome {90,80} (cf. Table 8) a lower ranking while Authority 
B actually prefers this. Note that similar to Case 1, we found that as the absolute elasticity 
increased, we move towards a low toll solution and only one NE. 
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Incentives to Compete 
 
 
 
Figure 11: (Left Pane) Welfare Plot for Authority A Showing Optimum at around 980 when 
Authority B does not levy any toll ; (Right Pane) Welfare Plot for Authority B Showing 
Optimum at around 80 when Authority A does not levy any toll.  
 
If B is always worse off why do they toll? The left pane of Figure 11 Figure illustrates the 
welfare of Authority A as it varies its toll when Authority B does not levy any toll. The right 
pane does the same for Authority B on the assumption that Authority A does not levy any 
toll. These show that both authorities have an incentive to enter the game since their 
individual welfares are higher compared to doing nothing. It is also evident that Authority A 
has a much larger incentive than Authority B.   
 
When the game begins, and we have shown that there is indeed such an incentive for one 
authority to begin the game, Authority B always ends up in the equivalent of a prisoners’ 
dilemma situation because it is always worse off under all the 4 LNE of Figure  than if it had 
not done anything. Similarly A is always better off (cf. Table 9). This is in stark contrast to 
case 1 where both authorities ended up being worse off.  
 
It is however possible to show that solution 2 is the NE as if A moves first then they set a toll 
of 955 and B responds with full information with a toll of 81 and vice versa. 
 
3.2.3 Policy Implications 
 
Our analysis offers a potential explanation for why large cities such as London can start the 
game and gain a first mover advantage while smaller authorities (when including set up and 
operating costs) decide that in fact the benefits of going alone are not even there – so this 
explains why there is a no-move case for the smaller towns – especially if they think that the 
other larger town will retaliate and they may end up being even worse off.  
 
In addition, our findings also lend support to the findings of an econometric study by 
Levinson (2001). Levinson found that that the more non-resident workers a state (in the 
United States) has, the greater the likelihood of tolling. By way of analogy to this case study, 
Authority A has a larger number of non-resident workers (compared to Authority B since 
more commute to work in its jurisdiction compared to Case 1) and therefore has a stronger 
incentive to apply tolls.  
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4. CONSIDERING COLLUSION 
 
 
Thus far we have assumed that α=1, i.e. there is full tax exporting behaviour. In the 
Edinburgh congestion charging proposals, authorities surrounding the city of Edinburgh were 
invited to share the revenues from the scheme so that they would lend support to the 
proposals (Saunders, 2005).  This form of revenue sharing can be modelled with the 
parameter α. When α=0 then we have full recycling of revenues back to those who paid the 
tolls.  For values in between there is some sharing of revenues collected i.e. some proportion 
of revenues are returned to the relevant authority.   
 
To find toll levels for each Authority that satisfy (11), we carried out a grid search of 
welfares for each authority varying the toll levels between 0 and 1000 second and carried out 
the contour plots of based on finite difference to approximate the gradients. As we have 
found from results in Section 3, there may be more than 1 NE that will satisfy (11) even 
within the range of tolls considered. Hence we also carried out a Gauss Jacobi 
diagonalization type algorithm (see Appendix C for details) for the purposes of locating the 
Nash Equilibrium toll solution within the locality of the grid search solution. 
 
   
4.1 Collusion – Case 1 
 
For Case 1, Table 10 shows the results of the Gauss Jacobi Algorithm for values of α 
between 0 and 1 inclusive.  We also carried out a grid search of the welfare surfaces similar 
to the previous case studies mentioned above.  
 
 
Table 10: Results of Gauss Jacobi Algorithm for Case 1 for different α (all units are seconds) 
α Toll on Links 
1 and 6 Set by 
Authority A 
Toll on Links 7 
and 12 Set by 
Authority B 
Welfare of 
Authority A 
Welfare of 
Authority B 
Global 
Welfare 
0 80.00 80.00 10146 10146 20292 
0.2 81.30 81.40 10057 10067 20125 
0.4 159.27 159.32 -19791 -19785 -39575 
0.6 240.24 242.72 -32099 -31680 -63779 
0.8 356.08 356.08 -54030 -54030 -108059 
1 504.70 504.70 -88006 -88005 -176011 
 
 
Table 10 shows that as α is reduced i.e. increasing the revenue recycling back to those who 
paid, then there is a tendency for the solution to move towards the lower toll regime.  In fact 
in the extreme case when =0 we obtain the exact same solution as under the global 
regulator problem for Case 1.  In this case there is an incentive for both authorities to collude 
which also brings greater benefits to society. However, this is no longer true when the 
demand is asymmetric as will be shown later. 
 
 
4.2.2 Collusion – Case 2 
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For Case 2, Table 11 shows the results of the Gauss Jacobi Algorithm with different starting 
points for selected values of α between 0 and 1.   
 
 
Table 11: Results of Gauss Jacobi Algorithm for Case 2 for different α (all units are seconds) 
α Toll on Links 
1 and 6 Set by 
Authority A 
Toll on Links 7 
and 12 Set by 
Authority B 
Welfare of 
Authority A 
Welfare of 
Authority B 
Global 
Welfare 
0 102.73 80.00 9064 -13286 -4222 
0.2 171.61 80.60 18584 -27629 -9045 
0.4 263.59 81.20 34843 -58788 -23945 
0.6 395.04 81.78 59781 -115609 -55828 
0.8 609.77 82.03 96634 -218552 -121918 
1 953.17 83.05 150585 -392325 -241740 
 
The result for the Global Regulator Problem for Case 2 was presented in Table 8. A single 
regulator would set a toll 90 and 80 on links (1 and 6) and links (7 and 12) respectively to 
maximise welfare. However the result with =0 is not in fact the same as the global regulator 
problem. It seems that in this case the stronger authority is still able to charge more (102 
compared to 90 in the GRP).  So in this case while Authority B would prefer to collude, 
Authority A would obviously gain more by not colluding and with tax exporting behaviour 
society would be worse off as a whole.  The implication when comparing the asymmetric 
case to the symmetric case is that there may be a greater need for regulation when there 
exists a stronger player (as is the case in other sectors).  For society to be better off as a 
whole in case 2 there needs to be a regulator in place which could also offset any disbenefits 
to those residents from Authority B by re-distribution of the revenues collected. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have explored the implications of competition between cities when setting 
toll charges.  First we have set up the problem as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium 
Constraints (EPEC) which is a special form of a Nash game with a hierarchical structure. 
Using a simple network we then applied simple grid search methods to determine the Nash 
Equilibrium toll levels, finding both local (LNE) and global NE solutions. We then 
investigated the policy implications for a symmetric and asymmetric case with and without 
collusion. 
 
In our first case study using a symmetric trip matrix, it is interesting that either authority 
should in principle wish to move first, but that once a move is made then the Nash game 
takes them both to a sub-optimal position due to the larger basin of attraction. They both end 
up worse off in a prisoner’s dilemma. For the asymmetric case, we find that the outcome of 
the game tended to be in favour of the stronger player with the weaker player being worse off 
than in the no toll case despite there being an initial incentive for the weaker player to set a 
toll. 
 
In our example we can see that if cities were to set tolls using a simple game or pay-off 
approach with limited step size (to represent a cautious decision maker), then it would be 
feasible for them to arrive at welfare improving LNE Solutions in the symmetric case.  
Whilst we have not defined how strategies are set in this paper (as we have simply explored 
the response surfaces to find solutions to the problem), our future research will investigate 
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the dynamics of the toll setting strategies and how this may result in an LNE solution. We  
will investigate how cities compete, which indicators can be used for decision-making and 
which kind of update strategies are likely. 
 
We also investigated which factors affected whether there exists only one or multiple NE 
solutions.  We found that for the network studied here, increasing elasticity not only results 
in a shift from multiple NE to one NE solution but that the global NE solution also moved 
towards the low toll regime where both cities’ residents are better off.   
 
We also reported that changing the amount of through demand and the congestion function 
used also results in only one NE solution. Whilst we demonstrated that multiple NE may 
exist under certain conditions and that under other conditions only one NE solution may 
exist, we are not in a position to say whether for any general network there will be one or 
multiple NE solutions.  Further research should consider more general networks, where 
mixed flow regimes are more likely, and the number of Nash Equilibria that may arise in 
such general networks.  
 
Finally, we also demonstrated that some signalling or collusion as may be expected in reality 
could in this case work to benefit all residents should cities act to maximise welfare under the 
symmetric case, which is in contrast to our previous work on toll competition between 
private operators where profit maximising behaviour coupled with collusion led to a decrease 
in welfare for residents (though increased profits for the operators).  However we also 
showed that with the asymmetric case the opposite is true and where there exists a player 
with market power then there could in fact be a stronger case for regulation. In modelling the 
collusion between authorities, we introduced a collusion parameter, α and assume that the 
parameter was common to both authorities. Further research could possibly investigate the 
impact of different values of this collusion parameter and how it would ultimately impact the 
conclusions presented in this paper. 
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APPENDIX A: Uniqueness of Equilibrium Link Flows Disaggregated by Authority 
 
We establish uniqueness of the equilibrium link flows disaggregated by authority, at any 
given toll vector, for the network shown in Figure 1 and assumptions specified in section 4. 
In order to do so, we shall make some mild additional assumptions. Let 
*
lg  denote the 
equilibrium generalized cost on link l corresponding to a given solution to (11). Formally, for 
any given toll vector solution τ to (11) these are given uniquely by the elements of vector *g :  
  * *( ) ,g g V τ 1 τ  (15) 
Specifically we make the assumptions: 
 
* * *
3 2 4g g g   (16) 
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* * *
4 5 3g g g   (17) 
 
* * *
10 11 9g g g   (18) 
 
* * *
10 11 9g g g   (19) 
 
* * *
9 8 10g g g   (20) 
With these assumptions, then we are able to establish uniqueness of authority flows through 
the following steps: 
 
 
i. Our assumptions on the cost functions and demand functions (stated in section 2) are 
well-known to be sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium total link flows 
and OD demands, so our question can be equivalently posed: in the given network 
structure, is this uniqueness sufficient to also guarantee uniqueness of the link flows 
disaggregated by authority? 
 
ii. At equilibrium, intra-authority OD movements will never use the links of the other 
authority. For example, one possible route form node 1 to node 2 is to follow the route 
given by the link sequence {2,7,10,11,6}, but since link costs are strictly positive it 
follows that such a route will always have higher cost than the route following links 
{2,6}, and so this earlier route can never appear in an equilibrium solution at any toll 
vector. An analogous argument may be made for all intra-authority OD movements, so 
for such movements we need only consider the routes that use links strictly within that 
authority’s jurisdiction. 
 
iii. The network structure is entirely equivalent to one in which an additional bi-directional, 
dummy link is added by dividing node 3 in two and inserting the link between the two 
nodes resulting from the divided node 3. The only flow on the left-pointing direction of 
this link will be (all of) that demand travelling from Authority B (node 4 or 5) to 
Authority A (node 1 or 2), there will be no intra-authority demand using it given the 
remarks in point ii. above. Returning now to the original network definition, we may 
thus (if we are thinking just from the viewpoint of Authority A’s network) represent the 
demand from Authority B as if it were from an origin at node 3 with OD flow to nodes 
1 and 2 equal to the relevant OD flows from the sum of nodes 4 and 5 (noting that such 
sums are unique since the individual demands are unique by remark i.). By symmetry, 
the same argument may be made regarding demand from Authority A to B, if we are 
thinking from the perspective of Authority B’s network. 
 
iv. Considering Authority A’s network, links 2 and 4 take traffic into node 3. In view of the 
comments in remark ii., such links could never be part of an equilibrium route for traffic 
from Authority B. Therefore links 2 and 4 only carry Authority A’s demand, and these 
flows are unique since the total link flows are unique by remark i. 
 
v. Assumption  (17) above means that for demand travelling from node 2 to nodes 4 or 5, 
it is  more costly (at equilibrium) to travel on the indirect route to node 3 (via links 3 
and 2) than via the direct route via link 4, and so such demand will never use the 
indirect route. This implies that the only Authority A flow on link 2 is that demand from 
node 1 (destined for nodes 2, 4 or 5). All the remaining demand from node 1 to these 
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other nodes must use link 1. Since at equilibrium we uniquely determine the total 
demand from node 1 (as the sum of demands to nodes 2, 4 and 5), and since in step iv. 
we have uniquely determined the Authority A flow on link 2, and since by the argument 
just made this flow on link 2 can only be from node 1, then by subtracting the (unique) 
link 2 flow from the (unique) total demand from node 1, then we have uniquely 
determined the flow on link 1 that is due to demand from node 1. Now we can note that 
no demand from node 2 would ever use link 1, so that the only Authority A demand on 
link 1 is that from node 1, and this is something we have just uniquely determined. Thus 
the Authority A flow on link 1 is unique, and by subtraction from the total link 1 flow 
(which is unique by remark i.) then the Authority B flow on link 1 is also unique. 
  
vi. Assumption (17)implies that it is never efficient for demand from node 2 to travel to 
node 1 via the indirect route of links 4 and 5, in preference to the direct route via link 3. 
In particular, it means that link 5 is not used by demand from node 2; neither is this link 
on a route from node 1. Therefore no Authority A flow uses link 5, only Authority B 
flow and so this must equal the total flow on link 5, which is unique by remark i. 
 
vii. Since by remark iii., the total Authority B demand arriving at node 3 (and destined for 
nodes 1 and 2) is uniquely determined, and since links 5 and 6 are the only exit nodes 
from node 3, and since by remark vi. the Authority B flow on link 5 is unique, then it 
follows that the Authority B flow on link 6 can be uniquely determined by conservation 
of Authority B flow at node 3. By subtraction from the total link 6 flow, the Authority 
A flow on link 6 is then also unique. 
 
viii. Consider node 2. By remarks iv., v. and vii., the Authority B flow on links 1, 4 and 6 is 
uniquely determined. By remark i., the total Authority B OD flow that is destined for 
node 2 is uniquely determined, and by definition there is no Authority B OD flow 
originating at node 2. Therefore, applying conservation-of-flow at node 2 to the 
Authority B flow, then the Authority B flow on link 3 may be uniquely determined, as it 
is then the only unknown in the conservation equation. By subtraction from the total 
link 3 flow, the Authority A flow on link 3 is then also unique. 
 
ix. Remarks iv.–viii. establish uniqueness of the authority flows on links 1–6, i.e. those 
under Authority A’s jurisdiction. By symmetry, equivalent arguments can be made 
about links 7–12 (under Authority B’s jurisdiction), exploiting assumptions (18)and 
(19) in place of (16) and (17) . 
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APPENDIX B: Cutting Constraint Algorithm 
 
As mentioned in the main text, the global regulator sets the tolls to optimize the welfare for 
the entire network (irregardless of authority jurisdiction). This is effectively a Mathematical 
Program with Equilirium Constraints (MPEC). The economic paradigm for a generic MPEC 
is based on the setting of a Stackleberg game where the leader sets his strategic decision 
variables and the road users on the network take the leader’s decision variables as given and 
optimize their route choice according to Wardrop’s Equilibrium Condition. A large amount 
of development has occurred in this branch of mathematical optimisation (Luo et al 1996) 
which has applications in e.g. mechanics, robotics and transportation analysis. The primary 
difficulty with the MPEC is that they fail to satisfy certain technical conditions (known as 
constraint qualifications) at any feasible point (Chen and Florian, 1995; Scheel and Scholtes, 
1995). In recent research, Koh et al (2009) investigated the use of the cutting constraint 
algorithm (CCA) (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 2004) to solve an MPEC in the context of 
second best congestion pricing and capacity optimisation. 
 
Reinterpretation of Variational Inequality Condition  
 
Let us define the additional variable 
 : a pre-specified upper bound on tolls, [ ]i   
 
As we have defined in the main paper (see equation (2)), the feasible region of flow vectors 
or “demand-feasible set” D , is a linear equation system of flow conservation constraints. 
From convex set theory, e.g. (Bazaraa et al 2008, Theorem 2.1.6 p.43),  , Dv d  can be 
defined as a convex combination of a set of extreme points.  Hence we can write Wardrop’s  
equilibrium condition of route choice as follows: 
 
# #( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( , )e e D     g v τ u v w d q e u e  
 
Where ( , )e eu q is the vector of extreme link flow and demand flow indexed by the 
superscript e, and E is the set of all extreme points of the demand-feasible set D 
 
A Cutting Constraint Algorithm for the MPEC 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm redefines the variational inequality using the extreme 
points. Together with the initial extreme point, generated by an initial shortest path problem, 
and the constraints defining feasible flows, the master problem is solved to find the optimal 
tolls and capacities at each iteration. Subsequently new extreme points (“cuts”) are found by 
solving a sub problem using the results for the current iteration. 
The CCA Algorithm is as follows:  
Step 0:  Initialise the problem by finding the shortest paths for each O-D pair; 
set l (iteration counter) = 0; define the aggregated link flow and demand 
flow ( , )l lu q ; and include ( , )l lu q  into E . 
Step 1: Set 1l l   Solve the Master Problem with all extreme points in E and 
obtain the solution vector  , ,v d ;then set  , ,l l lv d . 
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Step 2: Solve the Sub Problem with  , ,l l lv d and obtain the new extreme point 
(u
l
,q
l
); 
Step 3: Convergence Check:  
If # #( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0l l l l l l l    g v u v w d q d , terminate and  , ,
l l lv d  is the 
solution, otherwise include ( , )l lu q  into E  and return to Step 1. 
 
The Master Problem in Step 1 is defined as follows:  
 
 
 
1
, , ,
# #
min , , ,
. .
0                                           
,
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
i i
e e
s t
D
e E
 
  
  

     
v d
v d
v d
g v τ u v w d q e
 
 
The sub problem of Step 2 is a shortest path problem which is formulated as follows:  
 
    
 
1
,
min , ,
. .
,
TT
s t
D
   

u q
c v u D d q
u q
  
 
Further details of our implementation of the algorithm can be found in Koh et al (2009).  
 
 
APPENDIX C: Gauss Jacobi Diagonalization Algorithm 
 
The Gauss Jacobi/Diagonalization Algorithm (Harker, 1984) which was used find the toll 
tuple when the collusion parameter α was varied, as discussed in Section 4, operates as 
follows:  
 
Gauss Jacobi/Diagonalisation Algorithm:  
Step 0: 
 
Set iteration counter 0k  . Select a convergence tolerance parameter, 
(>0). Choose a toll level for each authority. Let the initial toll set be 
 
#
k k k
A B τ . Set 1k k  and go to Step 1, 
 
Step 1: 
 
Utilise the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (see Appendix B) of Hearn and 
Lawphongpanich (1984) to solve each authority’s individual welfare 
optimization problem i.e. the equivalent of  (5) , assuming that the 
opponent’s toll is held fixed.   
 
Step 2: 
 
If 1k kA A 
   and 1k kB B 
  are both less than terminate, else set 1k k   
and return to Step 1 where   refers to the Euclidean Norm. 
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